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Introduction 
In  general  an  acquisition process can be approached from different perspectives.  The capital market 
view focuses  on the question whether mergers and acquisitions do create wealth,  and if so, for whom 
(Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan,  1992). The strategy perspective identifies and evaluates opportunities 
for acquisitions from the "strategic fit"  between the suitor and target firm(s)  (Singh,  & Montgomery, 
1987), referring to  general  characteristics such as  industry,  market,  customer,  finance  or technology 
(Rappaport,  1979). The organizational behavior approach examines the effects acquisitions have on 
individuals  and  the  organizations  they  are  in  (Schweiger  &  Walsh,  1990).  Whereas  the  first  two 
consider  acquisitions  as  something  intrinsically  positive  (Jensen,  1984)  either  for  the  economy 
("capital markets") or the concerned individual firms ("strategy"), the organizational behavior approach 
has  drawn  our  attention  to  the  negative  impact  acquisitions  can  have  on  the  individuals  involved 
(O'Neill, & Lenn, 1995; Schweiger, Ivancevich, &  Power 1987). 
The compilation of empirical evidence from the  three perspectives has  led  to  the  conclusion that a 
strategic and an organizational fit between firms may constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for a successful acquisition. The process perspective acknowledges that the acquisition process itself is 
a potentially important determinant of acquisition outcomes (Haspeslagh &  Jemison,  1991; Jemison & 
Sitkin,  1986a, Jemison & Sitkin,  1986b). An  acquisition is  more than a simple adding up  of two  or 
more  previously  distinct  entities.  As  the  acquisition  proceeds  all  parties  concerned  evolve  and 
contribute to  the creation of the new entity. The capital market, strategy, and organizational behavior 
approaches study the inputs and outputs of the acquisition process, while paying little or no attention to 
the  dynamic  qualities  of this  process  itself.  Already  in  1962 Mace and  Montgomery  stated:  "Each 
organization acquired is composed of a unique combination of human and physical assets, and it is the 
job of the acquiring company management to motivate and administer the unique group to achieve the 
objectives which made the  arrangement appear to  be  a good deal  in  the  first place". From a process 
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outcomes  and  avoid  negative consequences during the  acquisition  process.  Haspeslagh and  Jemison 
(1991)  attribute  the  acquisition  success  of  some  firms  to  such  process  competencies,  whereas 
acquisition failures may be due to  a lack of them. Similarly Bruton, Oviatt and White (1994) found  in 
their research on  the  performance of acquisitions of distressed  firms  "that tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 
1958) about the acquisition process [  ...  J may be keyes) to their successful acquisition.". From the case 
we will present here, we see no  reason why such acquisition process competencies should be restricted 
to the overtaker. 
The aim of this paper is  to  study the acquisition process from the perspective of a local branch of the 
target.  Since most process  studies  are elaborated  from  the  viewpoint of the  "acquirer"  (de Anzizu, 
Vansina, et ai.,  1992), this  introduces a shift in  the research on take-overs and acquisitions from the 
"subject"  to  the  "object" position, from the  "powerful" to  the  "powerless"  (Sartre,  1959). Our study 
focuses on the specific actions a target in a take-over may undertake and on the rationale for doing so. 
Also acquisition studies tend to  focus on the level of the global organization (Saul,  1985). Executives 
and  consultants  responsible  for  structuring  acquisitions  have  shown  creative  expertise  in  putting 
together the legal and financial aspects of the "global deal" (Richman,  1984). Nevertheless it is at the 
local level where the real implementation of the merger will  take place once "the deal is through". In 
most cases the assets which the overtaker wants to acquire are situated locally: markets, products, R&D, 
human  resources,  ...  Normally  this  local  level  gets  not  involved  until  all  the  legal  settlements  are 
rounded off.  During this period the local management operates in  a vacuum. Their old "bosses" have 
lost authority and (have to ) stop communicating with them but the new ones have not yet come in and 
have not yet explained their intentions. Our research concentrates on what happens at the local office 
during the period the acquisition is dealt with at the level of the headquarters. It is clear to us that the 
acquisition  process  is  not  solely  confined  to  the  corporate  level,  but  that  within  the  targeted 
organization all kinds of actions and initiatives may be initiated. The literature has paid little attention 
to  this  aspect of a take-over process,  nor  to  the  attitudes that develop  in  this  process, and that may 
int1uence the acquisition outcomes. Once a take-over is  publicly announced, the situation of the target 
firm  is  fundamentally changed. It cannot but react in  some  way  to  the  novelty of the  situation. This 
reaction may  consist of a resistant attitude, or a proactive one depending on the intentions initiated by 
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violation  of the  firms'  integrity  and  everything it  stands for  and  attributes  negative  intentions  to  the 
overtaker. It can  take different forms.  The target may  passively resist and fall  into  a lethargic mode 
reigned by  the idea "let's wait and see what will come" or it may develop active resistance against the 
acquisition that should be fought and resisted at all costs. In a proactive mode the  management of the 
target mobilizes resources in  order to  influence its  future through managing the  continuity of its  own 
reality. Obviously, the future of the target will be largely influenced by  the intentions of the overtaker. 
If it  is  merely  interested  in  the  targets'  productportfolio  or  market  position,  little  future  may  be 
involved. However, if the acquisition will lead to a transition into the new "mother firm", the target firm 
can prepare this future by managing its continuity. The management of the target can e.g. try to prevent 
that important key-people would leave in the early phases of the acquisition process (Walsh,  1988), or 
that  the  seeds  of survivor  sickness  are  sown  among  those  who  remain  afterwards  (Schweiger, 
Ivancevich,  &  Power  1987).  We believe  that  the  acquiring  firm  can  benefit from  such  a  proactive 
attitude at  the  target company,  since this  may  reduce the  loss  of human capital. When the  acquiring 
company on the other hand does not acknowledge this continuity management the benefits of it may be 
lost later in the acquisition process. 
In  the  previous  paragraph,  we  introduced  the  concept  of managing  continuity.  Paradoxically,  the 
management of continuity received most attention in the context of innovation research. The process of 
innovation is "The development and the implementation of new ideas by people who over time engage 
in  transactions with others within an institutional order" (Van de Ven, 1986). However, "innovation is 
not confined to new technology or products. Turnarounds, take-overs, (  ... ) and so on are at the forefront 
of many  transformations."  (Bouwen  &  Fry,  1988).  Essential  in  Bouwen  and  Fry's (1988)  view  on 
innovation is  that successful organizational revival and development is  anchored in  the understanding 
and  experimenting  with  three  behavioral aspects  of everyday  organizational  life:  (a)  how novelty  is 
inu·oduced and transformed into compelling ideas for action (managing novelty), (b) how continuity is 
provided and maintained (managing continuity), (c) how transition is  accomplished with commitment 
and excitement (managing transition), and how all three loci are balanced and aligned with each other. 
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surface and are given enough discussion or consideration for  people to  accept or reject.  Bouwen and 
Fry  (1988)  found  that organizations  undergoing innovation clearly  need  to  be  "open" to  ideas  from 
within and  without the organization. Indeed,  the  novelty of something is  not solely determined by  its 
source  or  the  seriousness  of its  impact  on  organizational  functioning.  Following  the  open-systems 
model of organizations (Katz &  Kahn, 1978) the emphasis has drifted towards novelty coming from the 
environment. The aim  was  to  recognize it quickly and  consequently respond  to  it  in  a rational  way. 
Bouwen and Fry implicitly oppose this over-rational way  of proceeding by stating that "organizations 
capable of revival and  innovation are able to  "diverge and converge" throughout the process of idea 
formulation, concept development, design and implementation.". The concept of novelty is therefore of 
a plural nature. This plurality does not solely imply that novelty is  not a purely rational and objective 
concept, but also and especially that the "decision" whether something or a situation is novel resides in 
the experience of the people involved.  We suggest that in order to grasp fully the concept of novelty it 
is important to include the experience of those who are living it. 
The core assumption of the management of continuity is that in  any existing system, there are inherent 
strengths  that account for  what  the  particular system does  best.  In order to  minimize the  disruption 
which people experience during an  innovation or reorganization,  it is  according to  Bouwen and Fry 
(1988) essential to properly and correctly identify and seize these "first strengths", the "genetic pool" or 
the "heart of the organization". Indeed when organization members do experience that the changes that 
are inflicted upon them intend to  incorporate the  strengths that have caused them to have pride and 
commitment,  they  respond  more  favorably  to  the  innovation or change.  Similarly  starting  from  the 
observation that too many managers and business leaders think of continuity versus change, Salipante 
(1992) posits that "continuity in change, provided by reliance on organizational traditions, can produce 
adaptation that is  effective over a long time frame.".  Instead of looking at the past as  something that 
impedes change, it should enter in a symbiotic relationship with the future. 
Finally, in  the management of transition, planned change is  not so much the issue as  is  managing the 
"changing" that people experience (Bouwen &  Fry, 1988). In fact the organization must also be able to 
actually move, change, or transform in a clear, orderly fashion even if the final goal or objective is  still 
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transition.  First,  there  is  the  need  for  a  balance  or  trade-off  in  choices  about  planning  versus 
articulation: How does one elaborate and sequence tasks in such a way as to give needed direction and 
yet remain flexible enough to  alter plans in  response to  people's experience or objectives, keeping in 
mind  the  Hannan  and  Freeman  (1984)  remark  that  organizational  change  is  largely  uncontrolled. 
Second, there is the need to create "coincident meaning": how does one make common sense from the 
multiple  realities  of those  involved  so  that  they  move  toward  something  in  a  collective  committed 
manner?  And  thirdly,  there  is  the  need  to  ensure that organizational learning occurs:  that the people 
involved not only understand what they are doing with respect to a project or a new idea, but that they 
also consider what is to be learned about how their organization or system goes  about changing itself. 
novelty 
continuity  transition 
Figure 1: organization renewal and development triangle (Bouwen & Fry, 1988) 
In case oran acquisition it is  clear that the  take-over constitutes a major novelty for the  target firm, 
requiring a transition  that is  loaded with uncertainty.  Managing continuity in  such  a context implies 
identifying and reinforcing those aspects of the day-to-day operations which create in every employee 
enough of a sense of stability and security so  that they  can work to  their potential (and not have to 
worry about the uncertainty of future changes). The purpose of doing this is to ensure that core tasks are 
performed  at  desired  leveL  Eventualiy,  when  the  intentions  of the  overtaker  are  made  clear  and 
implementation  begins,  all  this  will  allow  the  local  office  to  create  a  shared  understanding of and 
commitment to the changing effort. By managing this transition in such a way, energy can be mobilized 
toward  a  newly  negotiated  state  of affairs,  even  in  a  condition  where  people  are  confronted  with 
extreme novelty, and an uncertain transition. 
Finally  this  case  study  is  a  significant  event  111  the  sense  that  it  underlines  the  compatibility  of 
organizational development and  strategy in  dealing with the dynamics and  actions that develop at the 
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approach concentrates more on  the  relational dynamics  that do develop between the actors involved, 
The  strategy  approach  stresses  the  structure-aspect of the  take-over:  the  importance  of having  and 
elaborating a rational plan. The tendency of the strategy approach to  stress the transition is  elegantly 
and  effectively  counterbalanced  by  the  attention  for  continuity  by  the  organizational  development 
approach. If  this balance is  seriously disturbed, the change will be experienced as too threatening. This 
can create unnecessary turbulence and confusion resulting in  a diminishing personal identification with 
work and/ or the organization (Bouwen & Fry,  1988). Therefore the combination of both the relational / 
continuity aspect and the rational/transition aspect of a take-over in the process approach (Haspeslagh 
&  Jemison,  1991; Jemison &  Sitkin, 1986a,1986b) leads to a more integrated and effective concept to 
deal with take-overs for researchers as well as practitioners. 
In  a sense, this study was accidental. Initially, the researchers were preparing a study of the integration 
process in  a local sales branch following an  acquisition by  the multinational parent company PYRCO 
USA (*)  . Their intention was to study the development and the functioning of an integration committee. 
It consisted  of local  office  members  of the  acquiring  PYRCO  as  well  as  the  newly  acquired  crop 
protection (CP) division. The main task of the integration committee was to plan, initiate, and monitor 
the actual integration of day-to-day operations. In the midst of these activities, the news came that the 
parent company PYRCO itself was the object of a take-over. 
This  sudden  and  unexpected  shift  in  perspective  offered  the  researchers  a  unique  opportunity  of 
studying the dynamics of an acquisition from the perspective of the local office of the target company. 
Thorough knowledge of the  local circumstances and  the history of the  branch, personal and  trustful 
contacts with key  figures  in the  organization, and  sheer presence allowed the researchers to obtain a 
vivid picture of the coping process developed locally following the take-over bid. 
It is  important to  stress that this  paper covers only and  specifically the period during which the local 
management itself was in a situation of uncertainty. This period started when the hostile take-over bid 
was  announced, and  closed when each member of the .management-team knew whether he/she could 
remain  within  the  company.  From that moment on,  there  was  a  significant difference  in  uncertainty 
(*ll Since clearance is pending, we have substituted the real names of the companies involved. 
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specific intraorganizational dynamics to develop and evolve which are not the subject of this paper. At 
the moment of the writing of this paper the acquisition has been through but the integration of these two 
previously distinct companies is still ongoing. It is the intention of the researchers to continue the study 
and the analysis of this case, focusing on different aspects of the transition towards "integration". 
Description of the process of the take-over. 
We will describe the process of dealing with the experience of being target in a take-over under three 
sections: (a) the story of the acquisition as  it was received and spread in the financial press (we will call 
this  "  The  Wall  Street  story"),  (b)  the  reactions  at  the  local  office  and  the  coping  process  that 
developed, and (c) the start of the implementation of the take-over at the local office which marks the 
end of the period of extreme uncertainty. In total this study spans a period of six months. 
The  Wall Street Story 
In  the  beginning  of August  1994  a  "press  leak"  in  the  Financial  Times  (2/08/1994)  disclosed  that 
PYRCO  was  planning  to  shift  its  focus  from  human  pharmaceuticals  to  animal  health  and  crop 
protection. This would involve an  asset swap with another player in the human pharma industry. As it 
was the middle of summer vacation nobody was really pressed to bring this swap quickly to an end. At 
that  time,  most  people  at  the  local  PYRCO  Benelux  Qklgium,  Netherlands,  Luxembourg)  office, 
including the general manager and half of the management team, were on holidays. 
On  the  next day  (03/08/1994)  RCP  launched  a hostile take-over bid ($8.5  billion)  on PYRCO. The 
announcement  came  out  of the  blue  sky.  It stunned  everybody,  inside  as  well  as  outside PYRCO. 
Although the pharmaceutical industry is  known for its  intense "merging and acquisition" climate, this 
specific take-over raised  many  questions  among specialists and  industry analysts. The questions and 
critical evaluations not only concerned the overtaker RCP, but also and especially the target, PYRCO. 
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personnel accompanied by  a radical restructuring of its  operations. For the first time in  three years the 
semester result was  not written in red.  The product portfolio  of PYRCO  was  described,  by  industry 
analysts, as solid but well on the way to become "outdated" in the near future. It contained no "big hit". 
The observation that no  promising new medicine was  "in the R&D tube" was not only formulated by 
the industry analysts. Inside PYRCO, also at PYRCO Benelux, this concern was for some time present 
in management discussions and began to develop into real distress. 
As  soon as  the  news of the  take-over was  out,  all  kinds  of "stories"  on  RCP popped up  in the press 
(Financial Times 4/0811994;  Wall Street Journal, 05/0811994;  Wall Street Journal,  1010811994;  Wall 
Street Journal;  12/08/1994; Wall Street Journal,  18/0811994;  New York Times,  18/08/1994; Financial 
Times,  19/08/1994).  Until  then  the  company had  rather avoided  press  coverage.  Unlike many  other 
pharmaceutical companies where science is king, it is,  according to people familiar with the company, 
the  finance  department that  rules  RCP.  So  was  reported  the  rumor  that  its'  chairman,  who  is  also 
president and  CEO,  had  to  approve every expenditure as  little as  $  1500,  a process that could take 
weeks or even months.  Within the sector RCP is  legendary for  its top-down-cost control system and 
according to industry analysts this rigid control system may have helped the company maintain a rock-
solid position. An important difference indicated by industry specialists was that the main performance 
indicator for RCP was margin whereas PYRCO was more focused on market share. 
Further, according to insiders, the global company culture of PYRCO differed considerably with that of 
RCP.  Whereas PYRCO posited itself as  a "life-sciences"-company active in human medicine, animal 
health and crop protection, RCP was active in many different markets such as prescription. drugs , OTC 
medication, food products (pasta, popcorn and mustard), toothpaste, ... 
The high bid of RCP also solicited questions concerning the financial implications. Financial specialists 
said that RCP would undertake substantial risks by  taking debt to  buy PYRCO, even if it sold some of 
PYRCO'  s  assets.  Even  a  small  decline  in  the  development  of the  pharma-industry  could  have  a 
substantial effect on the RCP's future cash-flow and could therefore create a financial nightmare for the 
new company. Stories of stripping PYRCO of some of its assets popped up  immediately. Rumors went 
that  the  agrochemical  and  animal  health  businesses  would  be  sold  to  finance  the  take-over although 
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business would be sold, was also raised. 
Nevertheless for some analysts the real problem with the proposed take-over was that PYRCO suffered 
many  of the  same  problems  RCP  did.  This  should  not  surprise  as  Bibeault  (1982)  observed  that 
distressed  firms  sometimes  initiate  acquisitions  themselves  in  an  attempt  to  improve  resources  and 
competitive position or to exit a difficult environment (Bruton, Oviatt, and White, 1994). 
The analysts challenged the conviction that in an increasingly competitive world, all others things being 
equal, big is  better, if for no  other reason than the cost savings that usually accompany take-overs. The 
critique was that being big wouldn't give the new to form company the kind of breakthrough drugs that 
it has lacked before. RCP "is in trouble not because they are small or inefficient", said an independent 
analyst, "they are in  trouble because they got the wrong drugs, their R&D is  lousy".  (The Wall Street 
Journal,  5/08/94).  RCP  was  known  as  being  among  the  lowest  R&D  spenders  in  the  industry 
committing only about 8% of sales, against an industry average of 13%. 
A decisive argument for  RCP to  launch the  take-over was  the  growing importance of cost-conscious 
managed-care organizations, such as health maintenance organizations, which have begun to control a 
greater  portion  of drug  spending  and  have  forced  the  prices  down.  To  make  its'  older  products 
attractive to managed-care customers, RCP had to discount steeply in the near past. As a result of the 
take-over, a broader product line might enhance RCP's negotiating power with managed-care buyers. 
Also PYRCO  's  generic drug business might open RCP more managed care doors.  " It is  been my 
opinion that horizontal growth is  the way  to  go in the pharmaceutical industry" said the chairman of 
RCP  in  his  commentary  on  the  take-over  (Wall  Street Journal,  05/08/1994).  He  was  eager  to  get 
PYRCO's prescription-drug  business  to  expand  RCP's  productline.  He  saw  PYRCO primarily  as  a 
portfolio of "Strategic Business Units" (Kroll & Caples, 1987). in the highly profitable pharmaceutical 
industry. He  believed that the  winners in the emerging cost-conscious environment will be those drug 
companies  with  the  biggest  variety  of products  to  offer  to  institutional  customers  such  as  health-
maintenance  organizations.  An  alternative  would  be  more  influence  over the  patient care and  drug 
Bouwen & Overlaet - Managing Continuity  page 9 selection and distribution (vertical growth), a strategy that is  followed by  some competitors within the 
industry. 
In  the  weeks  after  the  first  announcement the  "advise"  of PYRCO's board  to  its'  shareholders  on 
RCP's bid  shifted from  a firm  "no  "to an  acceptant "yes" and  in  the official rhetoric  the expression 
"hostile take-over"  was  replaced  by  "friendly take-over".  However,  it  was  clear that all  this did not 
change the power structure between the two parties. In three weeks time the context in which PYRCO's 
Benelux subsidiary was operating had completely changed. 
It  was  also  announced  that  the  take-over  agreement,  which  was  subject  to  approval  by  antitrust 
regulators,  might  take  months  to  complete  while  "Washington"  scrutinized  the  combination.  At  the 
moment of the  agreement both companies  said  they  anticipated  an  easy  approval  and  this  within  a 
month since the day of the take-over-agreement. Nevertheless the FTC's (Federal Trade Commission) 
anti-trust regulators started a long, detailed  and seemingly endless audit. This forced RCP to extend its 
offer  several  times.  So,  although  the  "deal "  was  agreed,  legally  it  could  not  be  completed.  This 
situation of "uncertain certainty" (Defrenne &  Delvaux,  1990) continued to  exist for more than three 
months from the official announcement of the take-over-deal. During this period no further decisions on 
the how of the take-over nor any action of RCP towards the local PYRCO offices was to be expected. 
This period of suspension did raise the suspense, and rumors and fantasies,  initiated by  stories in the 
press  or  local  gossips,  multiplied.  Especially  the  scenario  which  predicted  in  the  sale  of  the 
agrochemical division was very popular. The more the CEO of RCP insisted that there were no plans to 
sell this division, the more probable it became. In fact every part of PYRCO was considered an  ideal 
sale in order to improve RCP's burden of debt resulting from the take-over. Together with this scenario 
of asset-stripping, the nightmare of massive lay-offs was a dominant theme. Estimates ranged from 10% 
to 30% of the actual labor force of 78.000 within the newly merged company. 
The  development  of "  The  Wall  Street  Story"  confronted  PYRCO's local  management  in  a  rather 
abrupt way  with  an  extreme form of novelty.  As  one  manager said:  "Once the  take-over news  was 
known,  things were not the same anymore". Even at  the  PYRCO's headquarters people did not really 
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official statements on the situation from headquarters were general and extremely vague. Although the 
organization as physical structure and consolidation of assets had not changed by the bid, the launching 
of the bid caused a major change on its content and functioning. The take-over-bid demolished in one 
stroke  the  power base  ( and  legitimacy ) of the  local  management and  put an  end  to  the  functional 
relationships with the  PYRCO headquarters. Developing new relationships with RCP was the sole and 
unique way to manage this novelty. However, this relationship could not develop before the FTC would 
authorize  to  start the  transition.  In  fact  the  only  thing  the  management  could  do  during  the  FTC-
procedure was to  sit, watch, and wait for what had to  come. How could continuity be managed at the 
local  office  when  there  was  complete  uncertainty,  while  organizational  integrity  was  threatened  in 
multiple ways? 
We will now describe this period and analyze how the organization tried to cope with it. 
The coping process at the local office 
The  main  activities  of  PYRCO  Benelux  (approximately  250  employees)  consisted  of  the 
commercialization and the distribution of products for the health of man (pharmaceutical products and 
medical material), animal (veterinarian products & cattle feed  additives)  and plant (crop-protection) 
within the local Benelux market. There was almost no production or product R&D within the Benelux. 
During the last years the management of the local office had concentrated on major issues of internal 
organization.  First  of all  it  put  enormous  efforts  to  realize  an  actual  integration  of the  different 
divisions.  This  was  done  through  management  team  building,  integrating  policies,  developing  and 
implementing a value  and  mission statement,  and  symbolic management.  Secondly,  the management 
worked  on  the  implementation of quality programs oriented towards process control and integration, 
customer  satisfaction,  and  employee  development.  These quality  programs  were  initiated  when  the 
results of different surveys indicated that employees experienced lack of goal orientation as well as lack 
of identification  with  the  company  as  a  whole.  The culture  was  depicted  in  the  surveys  as  highly 
innovative and supportive but with little respect for  formal  rules (De Cock, Bouwen, De Witte, & De 
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control on process and outcome for the customer and reframing human resources development within a 
context of the total company (identification with the local office). Within this context there was recently 
the acquisition and the integration of a local branch of a crop protection division. 
The news of RCP's bid for PYRCO reached the local subsidiary by "silly coincidence". A friend of one 
of the managers who worked for a press agency faxed a copy of the newspaper article that announced 
RCP's hostile bid. At that moment nobody had yet heard something from the own headquarters in the 
USA, not even on the possible asset swap. In fact the take-over announcement preceded the news of the 
possible asset swap. Consequently, confusion reigned at the local office. Nobody really knew what was 
happening, or knew what to  do. The people that were supposed to take the situation in hands were on 
holiday at that moment. For the local office as organization as  well as the large majority of its workers 
this  was  the  first time that they were the target of a hostile take-over bid.  Right up  until then it had 
always been them who took over, and consequently had been in charge of the operation. They had only 
a vague idea of what they should do or expect. All this emphasizes the novelty of the situation. 
The first thing the general manager did,  as  soon as  he  was  back from holiday, was  to  distribute the 
message that although the parent company was besieged by a hostile take-over the principal assignment 
was "business as  usual". This message can be seen as  a first  attempt to  ensure continuity. The same 
products have to be sold to the same customers by the same salesmen and the strategic and operational 
targets remain the same. This rational approach however fails  to address the dynamic process set into 
motion by the extreme novelty of the external threats. The message of "although we are in the midst of 
a turmoil everything is  O.K." was consequently overruled by the emotional upset of the people. Their 
main occupation was to  find or produce information (rumors, gossip, .. ) to fill  the numerous blanks in 
their partial and  biased  understanding of the situation (Defrenne &  Delvaux,  1990). They anxiously 
wanted to  get a grip on what was going on, they wanted to find a manner to deal with the novelty that 
was  inflicted upon them.  Not only their professional situation had become more uncertain due to this 
take-over,  also  their  personal,  family  and  social  life  were  seriously  afflicted.  In  their  experience, 
evidently, the latter prevailed considerably on the former. As attention and energy was fragmented over 
these  separate and  distinct aspects of life,  there was  not much  left to  be "devoted" to  the  company. 
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(Schweiger, Ivancevich &  Power,  1987). We also observed reactions resembling the five stages of the 
Kubler-Ross' (1969) model of coping with loss: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. 
The  more  the  management stressed  that  nothing  special  was  going  on,  the  more  suspicious  people 
started to look after bits of news and information. The continuous flow of newspaper articles and faxes 
from colleagues in other local offices in which the overtaker was described as obsessed with heavy cost-
cutting  and  margin  maximizing,  certainly  did  not  provide  a  break  from  this  climate.  The  formal 
announcement that the take-over was a fact made clear that the "inevitable" had happened. It was as if 
they were facing a feeling of "death row". 
A  short  while  after  the  take-over-deal  was  confirmed  and  the  time  horizon  for  the  definite  legal 
settlement was announced, a certain sense of complicity among all members of the management team, 
an  'us against them"-feeling surfaced. More and more the idea matured that they should not become a 
sitting duck, they had to do something. Not only to have their mind on something else (cf. the specific 
repercussions of the take-over on their personal lives) but also to be prepared for the day when the new 
owner or its' representatives would walk in. 
Although the situation was certainly not excellent, it did provide a unique possibility to learn as active 
participant something about the who, what, when, where, and why of take-overs and acquisitions. Even 
if they personally would not survive this take-over, together with the management-team they would at 
least have learned something from it.  Bouwen and Fry (1988) observe that in case of innovations "an 
implicit demand in the executive or managerial ranks of the organization to understand and make sense 
out of where the enterprise has  been, where it is  going,  and  how it is  muddling through to that end" 
develops. 
Here we  can see that the concept of continuity can have different time horizons. In common business 
language  "continuity"  is  often  defined  as  the  continuity  of the  day-to-day  operations.  The  normal 
activities of the  local office should be performed according the  standards, or even better than  before. 
This  is  a  continuity  in  order  to  stay  alive.  The  general  manager's  message  of "business  as  usual" 
provides an  illustration of this  short-term vision  on continuity.  Long term survival is  at that moment 
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to  do their job, otherwise the organization will come very quickly to a stop. In fact these activities are 
the main reason why the local office exists. Diminishing the effort in these activities is endangering the 
immediate  day-to-day  survival  of the  local  office.  The  main  issue  of this  concept  of continuity  is 
damage-control. It is  of a reactive nature at PYRCO, reacting to  the  "threat" experienced due to  the 
take-over and  trying  to  "conserve"  as  much  as  possible,  keeping  things  "the way  they  have  always 
been". 
On  the  other hand there is  the  continuity of the local  office within the  new  to  form  local subsidiary. 
Where the  day-to-day  continuity  is  oriented  to  practical action,  long  term continuity focuses  on  the 
survival of the systems, processes, products, technology, ideas, values and norms that characterize the 
local office in different forms. Its' nature is proactive, i.e. oriented towards having impact on the things 
that  will  come.  The  management  of this  long  term  continuity  implies  that  one  can  remember and 
preserve what is  valuable in the organization even when things do  not remain the same. It is  assumed 
that managing this type of continuity will open people to engage in transition (Bouwen & Fry, 1988). 
The  initiatives  taken  by  the  local  management  were  a  clear expression  of care for  this  long  term 
continuity. At the same time it provided a way to cope emotionally with the novelty. When organization 
members experience that changes are incorporating the strengths which have already caused them pride 
and  commitment,  they  will  respond  more  favorably  to  the  innovation  or  change.  When  proposed 
changes fail to appreciate the current things people do well, then the change effort threatens their sense 
of continuity in that system. So identifying, anchoring, and maintaining the organizational strengths not 
only has consequences for the power of the local office in its struggle to ensure continuity but also and 
especially  for  the  morale within  the  local  office.  It gives people a reason  to  "fight"  for.  In case of 
PYRCO  Benelux  there  was  a  certain  attachment  expressed  towards  their  "mission  and  values" 
statement and  their total quality policy. These things had become of a symbolic value to them. At the 
same time this process helps in channeling the emotions of anger and grief (Kubler-Ross, 1969) and fits 
into  the  bargaining  tendency  (even  when  there  seems  to  be  little  bargaining  space).  So  there  are 
different reasons why this coping strategy  "managing the novelty by actually managing the continuity" 
could have a positive impact within the local office. 
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feeling  that a point of no  return had  been reached. There was  no  way  back and  this  was  grasped by 
everybody in the organization. The initiative to  get out of the ruling "every-one for himself' mode was 
taken by the general manager who was stimulated and supported by the human resources development 
(HRD)  manager.  The  surfacing  of an  idea  and  the  movement  of it  through  the  organization  often 
requires  extra-ordinary  effort  of  a  single  person  (Bouwen  &  Fry,  1988).  This  single  person 
distinguishes  himself from  the  others  because  he  is  able  to  shift  the  discourse  to  "what could  be", 
instead of staying stuck in "what is". The lapse of time between the final announcement of the take-over 
and the initiative of the managing director and the HRD manager can be partially attributed to  the fact 
they personally had to come to an end with their own fears and uncertainties induced by the situation of 
novelty, before they could initiate actions towards others. 
The  starting  point of the  managing  director  and  his  management  team  was:  "Which  competences, 
experiences and  knowledge do  we  possess that can be of any  help in this  specific situation?". After 
skimming through their organizational history, they hit on their considerable and  varied experience as 
overtaker.  So  they  inferred  from  this  what they  would  ask  or demand  when  they  would  be  in  the 
position of overtaker.  This  could then be used as  a basis to  start developing a dynamic and adapted 
response to the challenges and questions raised by the take-over. 
As a result of this analysis, the management team concluded the following: (a) RCP will examine very 
closely what happens at PYRCO, (b) RCP will benchmark among its own and newly acquired divisions 
before  making  a  decisive  choice,  (c)  all  decisions  important  for  the  local  office  will  be  taken  at a 
considerable distance and will be based on information and data generated by the local office itself, (d) 
RCP is aware of possible organizational changes, (e) RCP is in need of short term profits, and (f) "we, 
as local office, can and will have an impact on what is going to happen with us". 
In  order to elaborate this negotiation position into strategy, three main action programs were initiated, 
which  they  called:  (I) "business  intelligence",  (2)  "communication management",  and  (3)  "damage 
control" . 
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available on  the  overtaker (strategic,  financial,  legal,  operational,  product,  human resources,  culture, 
business plans, future developments, ... ).  Secondly, everything that was going on at the local office had 
to  be  thoroughly  and  exhaustively  documented.  Not  only  would  this  improve  the  insight  in  and 
understanding of the own organization, also if the new owner asked for certain kinds of information it 
could be  delivered quickly and  in  the way chosen by  the local  office itself. This would  give  them at 
least  some  kind  of control.  Finally,  they  developed  a  clear  concept of how  to  envision,  plan  and 
organize the current activities within the new local office that would be formed. This last aspect of long 
term continuity in the "business intelligence" effort would prove to be of great help when the transition 
effectively started. 
The management immediately recognized that the second pillar of the action program, "communication 
management", was of extreme importance. Communication had to  be closely monitored on content as 
well  as  on  process  and  developed  along  several  principles:  factual,  frequent,  honest,  good  timing, 
visibility, and  providing valuable feedback. A very important instrument for doing this was a "merger 
news"-letter.  The management used  this  letter  to  give  everybody  the  same information  at the  same 
moment.  The letter informed the employees on every development, even minor, of the take-over and 
provided honest and concrete answers to all questions raised by the employees concerning the uncertain 
situation.  It  explained  nicely  all  the  initiatives  developed  such  as  the  "merger  workshops"  or  the 
possibility for  each individual to  get personal  counseling.  Once the  take-over deal  was  through,  the 
PYRCO management distributed the same letter to the employees at the local Benelux office of RCP, of 
which  the  management  immediately  forbid  further  distribution,  although  the  local  RCP  people 
considered it a good initiative. It informed them on how the take-over was developing, which their own 
management had refrained itself from doing. 
The third element of the action program was "damage control". At that moment, the organization was 
almost functioning in  some kind of a vacuum. After all  there was an agreement on the take-over, but 
nothing could  be  undertaken until the FTC gave its  authorization. It was  business as  usual  but in  an 
unusual  situation.  Many  employees,  especially  competent salespeople,  were  approached  directly  or 
indirectly  by  competitors for  making a transfer.  Within the  world  of pharma-sales, it is  known that a 
good salesperson generally holds his/her clientele when (s)he shifts from one company to  another. So 
departures of salespeople not  only have direct repercussions  on  the personnel turnover but also  and 
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especially on the sales performance and therefore also on the financial performance of the subsidiary. In 
order to  retain  the  maximum of these people as  well  as  the  back office and  support activities,  it is 
necessary to  respond as optimal as  possible to  their questions and worries and help them to cope with 
uncertainty. Otherwise, once the take-over is  formally and legally finalized, the local office will remain 
only as a shadow of what it once was. 
An  additional  challenge  to  deal  with  is  that  those  who  will  survive  the  "transition"  must still  be 
motivated to  perform within the new organization. Often, the survivors are more or less neglected, as 
much of the  attention goes to  them who are urged to  leave the  company (O'Neill & Lenn,  1995). In 
order to guarantee a continuity in performance and a continuity in custom relations it is necessary to pay 
attention  to  the  manifestation  among  these  survivors  of diminishment  of risk-behavior:  decline  of 
productivity,  increasing need  for  information,  resentment and  grudge,  declining cohesion, decline in 
commitment (Schweiger, Ivancevich, &  Power, 1987). 
To tackle all this the management team installed different "coping-devices". A counseling structure was 
installed  envisioning  three  important continuity  objectives:  continuity  in  performance,  continuity in 
custom-relations,  and  retention  of good  people.  First  of all,  as  already  mentioned,  there  was  the 
newsletter providing a counterweight to the stream of rumors, questions and gossips that hit everyone in 
the organization. Next the management team assigned to the human resources development department 
the elaboration of a "merger workshop" where people would be informed what a take-over is all about, 
which different dynamics could be triggered in their personal life or among co-workers or colleagues in 
case  of such  a  radical  experience,  and  where  they  could  also  formulate  their  doubts  or questions 
concerning whatever aspect of the take-over. People received also tools that could help in dealing with 
the  unusual and difficult situation at the office and at home. Managerial staff would get coaching on 
how to  deal with the phenomenon of rumors in  his/her department or with the fact that somebody left 
the  company for  the  competition. Also  the  Ki.ibler-Ross  model (1969) was explained so that people 
could  get  an  firmer  grip  on  and  a  more adapted  understanding of the  feelings  of themselves,  their 
colleagues or their family triggered by  the take-over. Finally, a group of counselors was set up whom 
the  employees  could  contact  in  all  anonymity  with  all  kinds  of questions,  personal  as  well  as 
professional, concerning the take-over during as well as after working hours. All this was done in order 
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decision advice, and prevent survivor sickness. 
During the  period  of uncertainty  there  has  been  only  one formal  contact between the  local  PYRCO 
office and its' new sister firm in  the local market, where each organization presented itself to the other. 
Although this  meeting received positive feedback via the "merger news"-newsletter,  the management 
team's real experience was  in fact anything but positive. The stereotypes concerning the obsession with 
costcutting and  margin were confirmed. PYRCO Benelux  conception on how the new owner and his 
representatives  would  behave,  functioned  as  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy  (Watzlawick,  1976). 
Emotionally, they felt stepped upon.  The management team had the feeling that the "barbarians" had 
come in.  The management of PYRCO Benelux had  the  intention to  start a new working relationship 
among equals but now they felt themselves pushed into the role of the defeated, who had just to listen to 
what his  new master or his  representatives had  to  say.  Nevertheless, they sensed that the  local RCP 
people felt threatened by  them.  They experienced  that "their PYRCO" mastered things of which the 
representatives  of the  new  owner had  not even heard  of,  or which were  only very limitedly applied 
within their organization, e.g. information technology, HR-development, .... The meeting with the local 
RCP people thus  confronted  the  management of PYRCO with  a reality  which  was  worse than their 
worst fantasies, not because of any of RCP's intentions, but because it confronted them with the reality 
of their  subjugation.  Since  the  meeting  confirmed  feelings  of superiority  towards  RCP  some  team 
members adopted the metaphor of the Greeks being conquered by the Romans. The latter had, just as 
RCP,  more  resources  (quantity)  to  fight  and  defeat  the  Greeks,  PYRCO,  whose  resources  were, 
according  to  themselves,  of a much  higher level  (quality).  But,  as  everybody knows,  eventually the 
Greeks'  integration in  the Roman Empire was  the  start of a massive wave of hellenization of Roman 
society and culture (Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1968). 
Although the  new  headquarters did not interact with  the local PYRCO office,  it was present in  their 
fantasies  and  expectations  and  a  kind  of relationship  had  developed.  This  "relationship"  had  two 
components which were shared and· developed through specific "expressions"  that acquired a shared 
meaning  amongst  PYRCO  employees.  One  component  originated  from  the  "silence"  from  RCP 
headquarters, which  was  described  as  "fog". PYRCO management felt  as  if RCP raised a deliberate 
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where  or why.  This  strategy corresponds  with  the game  theoretic  proposition  that  in  complex and 
uncertain  situations  a  random  strategy  is  preferred  in  order  to  become  unpredictable  for  the  other 
players  in  the  game  (von  Neumann  &  Morgenstern,  1944).  Whenever a  vague  signal  would  come 
through  the  fog,  it  would  contain  the  message  that everybody should  be  prepared for  the "big job" 
which could be expected to start at any moment. The fact that one does not know exactly what to expect 
makes that one prepares for the worst.  PYRCO management felt as "simmering" in  a pot. It must be 
remarked that there is  no  evidence whatsoever that the silence of RCP headquarters was  due to  such 
tactical intentions, but for the PYRCO management the attribution was real. 
The  other  component  relates  to  the  language  itself.  People  at  PYRCO  started  to  label  situations 
differently  then  they  did  before.  They started  to  use  a  new  vocabulary.  Not because  situations  had 
changed, but because doing so made it more easy to  get things moving while wandering in the "fog". 
This "new language" was a way to get more grip on the situation. It can be interpreted as an anticipation 
of the new reality, as  a step towards transition. As Weick (1979) said "Organizing is like a grammar in 
the sense that it is  a systematic account of some rules and conventions by which sets of interlocked 
behaviors are assembled to  form social processes that are intelligible to  the actors.".  The way some 
things were labeled provided brief but clear implicit directions how these things were considered by the 
new owner and consequently how they should be handled. By erasing the vocabulary and the grammar 
necessary to  describe or discuss certain things,  one can get the  impressions that these things do not 
exist, at least not on a formal and explicit level. One way of adapting the language of the new owner 
was by excluding "fuzzy stuff' from public discourse. So instead of talking about people and values, 
one should concentrate on what really matters: products, markets, profit, briefly the numbers. 
People  got  informed  on  the  new  language  through  a  surge  in  informal  meetings  and  information 
exchanges. Everybody knew that they occurred, but since they were not allowed,  it was impossible to 
refer to them. Within the newly developed organizational language and grammar, they were considered 
to  be non existent. So it happened when someone discussed informally some matters with a colleague 
from another local office, and came to agreement on these matters, (s)he could not use this information 
in a formal context on the same subject with the same person. 
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take-over at the local subsidiary 
The experience of take-over at the local office as  described above can be qualified as  an innovation in 
which the disruptive character prevails. But it is  not sufficient in this case to know what one does well 
(continuity), and have an  idea of where one wants to  go or go  toward (novelty). The local office must 
also be able to actually move, change, and transform in a clear and orderly fashion even if the final goal 
is still a moving target. Indeed, only when Rep came in,  the transition could start and the novelty could 
be  "digested" rationally as  well  as  emotionally. Managing transition therefore implies understanding 
how  the  organization  moves  effectively  from  one  state  to  another,  often  an  unknown  one.  Many 
organizations  struggling  with  transition  experience  the  need  for  "a  common  script",  a  shared 
understanding at any point in  time, of what the innovation is  about and where it is heading  (Gioia & 
Poole, 1984). Given the power relationship this script will be largely determined by Rep. 
As soon as the legal settlement concerning the take-over was handled, actions towards implementation 
and  consolidation began.  Two different tracks  were initiated.  First, Rep imposed  a timetable and  a 
budget system. Secondly there were the initiatives taken by consultants appointed by Rep. 
1. The Take-over Timetable 
One  week  after  the  legal  settlement  was  finished  (29/l1/1994),  a  big  booklet  called  "Take-over 
Timetable" was dropped on the desk of the general manager. It contained a very tight time schedule that 
indicated what had to be done by when. Week by week solid objectives were given. As the management 
red  through  it  everybody saw immediately  that  it  would  be  almost impossible to  meet the  imposed 
deadlines.  For every  specific question  (finance,  management control system,  marketing,  distribution, 
information technology, personnel policy, ... ) a specialized project team was established. All members 
of the management team figured on more than one project team. The time pressure and workload was 
considerable.  Every  week  a  large  variety  of meetings  had  to  be  held  and  enormous  amounts  of 
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involved. The timetable also gave indications by  when  staffing decisions were to  be  taken.  So within 
two  weeks  the  name  of the  new  general  manager  was  to  be  announced,  six  weeks  later  the  new 
management  team  was  to  be  designated,  and  again  six  weeks  later  the  report  to  execute  the  final 
restructuring of the local office had to be submitted to the new headquarters in the USA, and therefore it 
would by then be known how the local office eventually would be staffed. 
This "time-table pressure" was  accompanied by a budget system called the "RCPT" ("T" referring to 
Treasury).  From  that  day  on  an  "RCPT"  was  the  only  way  to  get  things  done  within  the  new 
organization. Together with the command obligation came a brief description of how to  use it.  But it 
was too concise to be understandable for novices. "RCPT"  is in fact the standardized way of proceeding 
within RCP. Without "RCPT" you can't do anything, and something that can not be translated into an 
"RCPT" simply does not exist. An "RCPT" is  literally a form on  which has to  be described what you 
are planning to  do and what resources this will take. The space available to describe your project, the 
function you are creating or the person you are hiring, ...  is  so restricted that you are forced to  limit 
yourself almost uniquely to  quantitative data. Historically it started as a way of controlling the (ab)use 
of resources, actually it has evolved to be the dominant way of communicating in the RCP organization. 
This  unilateral  imposition  of "RCPT"  can  be  considered  as  an  artificial  and  forced  creation  of 
"coincident meaning" (Bouwen, De Visch, and Steyaert, 1992). Instead of going into dialogue about the 
multiple realities  that do  exist  within the  two  formerly  distinct organizations,  the  new  headquarters 
enforced their "reality" on the local office. Besides, not only new words (vocabulary), had to be learned 
to  describe "briefly" but "correctly" what one sought to do,  also a new way of proceeding had to  be 
mastered (grammar) to  make that one followed the right channels and procedures, addressing the right 
people, etc  .... So, not only new information had to  be sought, it had also to be formulated under a new 
format  in  a  new  language  unknown  to  the  people  at  the  local  office.  From  the  beginning  it  was 
communicated by RCP's headquarters that only messages expressed in this "language" would be dealt 
with, the others would be considered non-existent. Although this "RCPT"  -way of working was exactly 
the opposite from the original way of doing things at the local PYRCO office (as said they originally 
had little respect for formal rules), the very tight time schedule combined with the fact that all positions 
still had to  filled  in,  made it very difficult to express some comments. As  we heard from many people 
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referred to as an "invasion". 
Everything  at  the  local  office  was  accelerated  by  these  two  initiatives.  It was  as  if the  whole 
organization was caught in  a rapid. There was no more time for doing other things than those asked for 
by  the  new headquarters. The considerable workload created among the members of the management 
team  a  permanent  feeling  of deadline.  One  deadline  had  not  yet  been  met  or  another  popped  up. 
Therefore there was a continuous but restricted focus on the action level. People were too busy doing 
things. They did not really have the possibility to ask themselves why they were doing them or how they 
should be doing them. The important aim was just to meet the imposed deadlines. All creative, critical 
and constructive (meta-)thinking or learning suffered from this workload. Consequently organizational 
learning which according to  Bouwen and  Fry (1988)  is  an  essential part in  a transition process was 
seriously  hindered.  One could compare the  imposition of this  timetable with  a kind  of occupational 
therapy  to  keep  people  so  busy  that  they  would  not  engage  in  critical  or  differentiated  thinking 
concerning what was going on in their organization. 
Furthermore both the timetable and the budget system were imposed without communication with the 
local  office.  There was  no  explanation provided why things  were done this  way  and  not otherwise. 
Therefore the flexibility that according to Bouwen and Fry (1991) should be present in the planning and 
sequencing of a transition was in this case very limited. 
2. The consultants are moving in 
One week after the time table sent shock waves through the organization a second invasion followed. 
Without any notice a number of consultants appointed by the RCP head office arrived in order to lead 
and facilitate the take-over process. Immediately, without consulting the people involved, a demanding 
time frame and task schedule was  imposed. They started forming new teams and project groups which 
had to gather specific data concerning products and the markets. The focus on the "strategic fit" (Singh 
&  Montgomery,  1987)  was  dominant  in  their  approach.  Everything  had  to  be  done  following  their 
specific way  of proceeding. This was  instrumentally illustrated in  the material they  used.  In  fact they 
provided frames  in  which  numbers had  to  be filled  in.  Due to  the  pressure of time and the  workload 
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So  no  real  dialogue  on  how  to  proceed  and  why  was  developed.  The  structure  of the  work  was 
unilaterally imposed. There was little attention attributed to the specificity or uniqueness of the context. 
Strangely enough,  although  all  the  demanded  data were  exclusively quantitative,  no  questions  were 
raised  concerning  the  way  these  numbers  were  generated.  The  most important  thing  was  to  have 
numbers.  Therefore the  consultant had  complete and  perfect input and  output control  on  the  whole 
process. Because it was the consultants who imposed the framework that had to be used to generate and 
process the data as  well as it was only them who  took care of the final  presentation of the work to the 
new owner, the sense of ownership of the people at the local office concerning the implementation of 
the take-over was restricted. 
The  local  office  was  not  identified  as  an  important  stakeholder  in  the  transition  process  by  the 
consultants. They behaved as  a kind of "commissioners" or direct agents from RCP headquarters as if 
to  complement a not yet developed reporting structure as  the implementation of the take-over was just 
starting  (White,  1992).  Although  the  initiatives  developed  earlier  demonstrated  its'  potential  to 
participate as cooperator in the process as well as  its' potential as threat towards it. This made that the 
local  office  was  "forced"  to  evolve  from  a  mixed  blessing  stakeholder  towards  a  non-supportive 
stakeholder (Savage, Nix, Whitehead, & Blair, 1991). 
In fact the consultants way of proceeding followed nicely the same logic as is imposed by "RCPT". Not 
only it demanded almost exclusively quantitative data, in  addition it elicited an enormous work effort 
which reduced seriously the possibility of critical discussion or analysis of the situation. 
Discussion 
Although the "story" of the take-over is  not complete, we  have chosen to break it off at this point. We 
believe that with the entrance of the consultants, the introduction of the new budget system and the first 
official  meetings  with  headquarters,  a  process  of actual  change  is  started,  which  is  fundamentally 
different from the process of the preceding period. Uncertainty gradually decreases with decisions on 
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management team were appointed only a few  weeks after the consultants came in,  and they started to 
develop new relationships with  the (reorganized) headquarters. Contrary to  the previous period, these 
relationships were now based on  actual experience, and not only on fantasy.  Far from suggesting that 
such  a  transition  is  easy  or  painless  for  those  involved,  we  want  to  focus  our  discussion  to  what 
happened at the local office in those first months of extreme uncertainty before the actual change begun. 
How can the efforts of the local management to  deal with the extreme and externally imposed novelty 
be  understood  as  managing  continuity,  and  how  did  it  prepare  those  involved  to  the  major 
organizational transition they were facing? 
This section is  structured around three issues.  First,  we  will  start from the distinction made between 
short term and long term continuity. Secondly, managing long term continuity will be  elaborated as  a 
complex and permanent process of (re)creating a sense of value and legitimacy. Finally, the importance 
of and the opportunities for an adapted and integrative action of the overtaker will be addressed. 
A first observation in this case study was  the distinction between short-term and long term continuity, 
and the initiatives of the local management were described as a balanced mix between the two. At first 
the managing director issued  a "business as  usual",  but this  was  soon complemented with  initiatives 
such as the merger news, business intelligence task forces and merger workshops. The question we want 
to address here is why this balance was necessary. 
In  case of a hostile take-over short term  continuity becomes an issue as  soon as  the  bid  is  known, 
especially at the  local  offices.  Through the  bid  the context for  normal  operations is  destroyed  : the 
power base of management is  threatened, contractual authority is reduced, the validity of the incentive 
system is questioned, and in general the expectancies and contingencies which rule peoples behavior on 
their job will be put to  a challenge. Depending on its nature; the integrity of the primary process itself 
may  be  impacted from  the  bid.  Competitors e.g.  will  approach key employees  and  customers,  111  an 
attempt to profit from the confusion which accompanies the take-over. 
Managing  short term  continuity  therefore  means  managing day  to  day  survival.  Its  time  horizon  is 
restricted to the immediate urgencies of the local operations. What do we have to do now to  avoid loss 
of (immaterial) assets?  The aim is to survive and to avoid the trap of slipping into a lethargic mode. It 
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order  to  preserve  her  general  condition.  How  this  short  term  continuity  is  managed  may  be  less 
significant than the fact that it is actually managed. 
The time horizon of managing long term continuity on the other hand goes beyond the urgencies of the 
moment and concentrates on issues that are not of immediate importance for the business but that are of 
great value for the future of the organization. It may seem strange to talk about long term continuity at 
all  in  a  situation  of a  hostile  take-over,  where  there  appears  to  be  little  continuity  for  the  target 
company, soon being absorbed into the acquiring company. However, although structures, systems and 
people may  change dramatically, the primary process itself probably will remain relatively unaffected 
by the  acquisition. When e.g.  the  agriculture  division of PYRCO  would  be split off or sold,  people 
would continue to  develop,  produce and  sell  crop protection chemicals  and  animal pharmaceuticals. 
The question is : would they still find meaning in their job? 
The aim of managing long term continuity is to stimulate the employees in reaching out for the future. It 
provides a sense  of purpose,  even when  things  are  changing drastically  (Vaill,  1989),  and  creates  a 
developmental focus which is necessary for entering the transition process that is ahead. In the PYRCO 
Benelux  case  the  management of long  term continuity  focused  on  the  identification of values  and 
valuable practices and how they could be retained and developed for the people in the future office. The 
initiatives taken in themselves were already an expression of these basic values, i.e. care for people and 
entrepreneurship. 
Managing  short  term  and/or  long  term  continuity  can  occur  111  four  different  combinations,  as  is 
demonstrated in Table 1. Before addressing the possible combinations, we would like to emphasize that 
we  understand the management of both types of continuity as collective action or "enactment" creating 
shared meaning. The initiatives of the  local management at PYRCO can be seen as  anchors focusing 
organizational discourse and action, and providing a legitimate platform to discuss the emotions that are 
elicited by  the take-over announcement. It is  not essential that these initiatives should originate from a 
deliberate and conscious choice or that they should be labeled as "management of continuity". 
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structure  or  initiative  for  survival,  neither  for  the  business,  nor  for  the  individuals  involved.  This 
corresponds to situation (a)  in Table 1. Management may just look after itself, as was the case with the 
Barings  Bank,  where  senior  management  was  reported  to  be  mainly  interested  in  its  own  bonus 
(Financial Times 2/03/1995; Financial Times 4/03/1995). Such a condition may lead  to  a situation of 
"every man for himself', and cause a solid decline of operational performance, as  well during as after 
the  implementation  of the  take-over.  Because of their  involvement  with  daily  operations,  local  and 
lower level managers may be less susceptible to  this choice, since their defection will be more visible 
and consequential. 
Management of short term continuity 







"business as usual" 
(c) 
Table 1 : managing short term and long term continuity. 
no survival 




When the local management reacts to a take-over announcement by focusing exclusively on the issues 
of long term continuity, they may become too much absorbed by their future and neglect the continuity 
of day  to  day  operations.  This  is  represented  in  situation  (b)  in  Table  1,  which  we  labeled  as 
introspective.  It is  clear  that  the  PYRCO  Benelux  management  did  not  fall  into  this  trap.  The 
management team immediately realized that their chances for  personal  "survival" depended on their 
ability  to  ensure operational continuity. At first,  their focus  was  exclusively on short term continuity 
(situation  (c)  in  the  table),  when  the  managing  director  called  for  "business  as  usual".  However, 
employees did not buy into this,  because, in the most literal sense of the word, it did not make sense to 
them. Moreover, since at PYRCO Benelux people were used to a commitment strategy (Walton, 1985), 
forcing them into business was no valid option, because that would have meant an even greater cultural 
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environment,  which  is  a  relative  insensible  to  its  owner  structure,  and  where  a  control  strategy  is 
common practice. 
At  PYRCO  Benelux  it appeared  that the  call  for  short term  continuity could  only  be justified by  a 
simultaneous management of the long term continuity. People at PYRCO identified very strongly with 
their business.  Loosing their personal and  organizational long  term perspective caused great anxiety. 
Because the initiatives that were developed (business intelligence, damage control, and communication 
management)  tried  to  restore some sense of legitimate  purpose,  they allowed  the  employees to  cope 
with  the  novelty  of the  take-over  situation  and  face  the  transition  ahead.  At the  same  time,  these 
initiatives addressed  the issues  of short term continuity, as  e.g.  the term "damage control" indicates. 
Because "profit and growth" was one of the basic values of the local PYRCO office, this combination 
was not experienced as contradictory. Short term continuity (performance) was relevant for maintaining 
their entrepreneurial identity, but a long term perspective was a necessary condition for the commitment 
to  their  work.  We  believe  that integrating  the  management of short term and  long  term continuity 
(situation (d) in table 1) not only made sense at PYRCO, but that it constituted an excellent preparation 
for the implementation of the take-over. 
In  the  preceding  discussion  we  defined  long  term continuity  very  broadly  as  providing a  sense of 
legitimate purpose in the face of change, offering those involved an experience of continuity. Although 
the experience of continuity must be holistic in  nature, since it integrates past, present and future in a 
comprehensive  framework,  we  believe  that  three  components  can  be  identified  in  the  process  of 
creating this sense of legitimate purpose: (a) an interpretation of the past which is compatible with (b) a 
vision  for  the  future,  and  (c)  which  is  shared  amongst  the  network of power.  Since  all  three  are 
interrelated,  the  order  of elaboration  is  arbitrary.  The  first  two  components,  for  instance,  may  be 
switched, and read as "a vision for the future, which is rooted in the past". 
There is no experience of continuity without appreciation of the past. People will experience continuity 
when  they  can  recognize the  past in  their  present actions and  in  their intentions for  the future.  This 
appreciation is  more than an interpretative act, since its  meaningfulness implies a commitment to past 
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guide to current action, and when this reliance is passed down over several generations, one may speak 
of a tradition (Salipante,  1992). Traditionality,  i.e.  the  sense of tradition  within an  organization, can 
effectively  guide  change  in  a  way  that  ensures  coherence  to  organizational  practices  and  member 
commitment  to  key  organizational  values  and  beliefs  (ibid.).  In  the  case  of PYRCO  Benelux,  the 
management team identified strongly with their TQM system, their focus  on customer satisfaction and 
entrepreneurship, and their emphasis on personal development. An  opinion survey in  1992 showed that 
employees shared these values, which were built through numerous projects, starting from the mid 80's. 
Since  this  "PYRCO  Benelux  way  of  doing  business"  had  survived  numerous  changes  in  the 
management team, including a new managing director, it can be  viewed,  to some extent,  as  a starting 
tradition. However frail the tradition was, there had been conscious efforts to create a strong culture and 
its definition had received general acceptance by the dominant network within the local organization. 
Some elements of this tradition, such as employee development, were already explicitly recognized, as 
they were part of a local mission statement which was developed a couple of years ago. Other elements, 
such  as  the  entrepreneurship,  were  only  realized  during  the  take-over  process.  The  fact  that  the 
perceived (or fantasized) values and practices of RCP contrasted highly with those of PYRCO Benelux, 
of course  increased  their  sense  of importance.  However,  the  take-over  bid  at  once questioned  the 
legitimacy and status of this tradition as it destroyed the context in which it had grown. This brings us to 
the second component of long term continuity, i.e. a vision for the future. 
It is clear that any appreciation of the past will remain without meaning, unless it has a relevance for the 
future. Therefore it is essential to envision this future,  not as a prediction of what will actually happen, 
but  as  an  intentional  framework,  that  can  guide our  actions  and  expectations.  The  creation  of this 
framework is  a permanent process and involves testing and maintaining boundaries at all levels of the 
organization,  in  order  to  ensure  coherence  and  unequivocality  of intentional  action  (Hirschhorn  & 
Gilmore,  1994).  In  case of PYRCO Benelux,  the  announcement of the  take-over bid  suspended this 
process  of  envisioning  and  consequently  impaired  a  meaningful  appreciation  of  their  past.  The 
initiatives taken by the local management were, at least partially, oriented towards dealing with the set 
of highly paranoid fantasies, that filled the void caused by this suspension. And the frenzy of activities 
that suddenly developed when  at last the consultants entered, can be interpreted as  a reaction of relief, 
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take-over returned  the  concept of "future" to  the  PYRCO employees, even  when the content of this 
future was still far from clear. 
Since we defined  long term continuity as  a sense of legitimate  purpose, this  conception refers to  the 
network of power. One of the most immediate effects of a hostile  take-over bid,  is  that it drastically 
changes the existing power structure. It destroys the power base of the local management. The radical 
changes at corporate level  will eradicate the network that every manager has  built during his  career. 
When we  asked  the  new local  management team one  year  after  the  implementation  what they  had 
experienced  as  a  loss  in  the  acquisition  process,  all  ex-PYRCO  managers  referred  to  loosing  their 
corporate network. They missed this informal source of support and legitimacy, even when their formal 
power status was fully restored. Without the consent of such a network, the legitimacy of any sense of 
purpose would be solipsistic. Therefore, even a year after the implementation, long term continuity was 
still "in the making" and the legitimacy of the appreciation of PYRCO's past precarious. 
In summary, managing long term continuity is a quest for a sense of legitimate purpose. This implies an 
appreciation of the past which is  consistent with a vision for  the future,  and approved by the power 
network at corporate level. Our elaboration of the concept of "continuity" shows why the process will 
go on until a new stability has been reached and is  accepted. In case of mergers and acquisitions it is 
known  that  such  a  transition  typically  takes  several  years.  In  a  dynamic  industry  such  as  the 
pharmaceutical industry, managing the continuity may never be completed altogether, since structural 
change is prevalent. 
It is  clear from the case that the local management cannot manage continuity on  its  own.  During the 
period  before the  implementation,  the  local  management can take care of short term continuity and 
prepare for the transition to come. At PYRCO the special initiatives that were taken did not only help to 
appreciate the past and  open up  for  an  uncertain future,  they  were also manifestations of the valued 
tradition, exemplifying its continuity and importance. When the implementation of the take-over starts, 
the  management of the acquiring company will join the process one way  or another. At that time the 
acquiring management has the choice to  build further on the local efforts or to brush them aside or even 
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operation may still suffer a sharp decline in performance, due to motivational problems. A structural bit 
of luck at PYRCO was that most top and middle managers of the Belgian pharma division, including 
the  managing  director,  survived  the  acquisition  and  the  subsequent  merger  with  the  local  RCP 
subsidiary. This provides a basis for continuity through people. We had no direct access to the reactions 
of RCP  headquarters to  the continuity efforts by  the  local  management.  From indirect observation it 
seems  that  these  reactions  were mixed.  In  a  recent personnel  survey,  two  thirds  of the  ex-PYRCO 
employees reported that they recognized their previous company identity in the new merged entity, as 
much as  or more than they recognized RCP practices. At this moment the local office is  still in full 
transition, so the final outcome of this case is still uncertain, but the mentioned survey result indicates 
that some long term continuity has been provided. 
Conclusion 
This case study deals with the experience of being a target in a take-over. It provides an illustration of 
the usefulness of a process perspective for the study of an "acquisition in progress" at the local level. 
This perspective allows to  focus  on issues  such as  the management of continuity,  in all  its  dynamic 
complexity. 
The focus of attention in the acquisition as process can thereby be expanded from the urge to recognise 
external change (novelty) and responding to it appropriately, to  identifying and recognising the purpose 
of the  organisation and respecting its' traditions (continuity).  Stressing the management of continuity 
emphasises  the  importance  of developing  a  legitimate relationship  between  the  past and  the  future 
which has  to  be established in  the acquisition process at the local level. Although the different actors 
remain rooted in their own distinct past, they have to grow towards a common future (transition). 
In the literature on mergers and acquisitions little attention is given to  what happens at the local level in 
the  acquisition process. This study illustrates the powerful dynamics that can develop locally.  In our 
case  they  were  labeled  business  intelligence,  communication  management,  and  damage  control. 
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acquisition  as  process.  Especially  the  pro-active  role  of the  management  at  the  local  office  seems 
interestingly enough for future research. 
We are  aware  that this  approach  needs  further  elaboration.  Any  case study has  its  limitations.  For 
instance, it would have been interesting to  gather supplementary data at RCP headquarters level, or at 
the local  RCP subsidiary.  Further our analysis  is  mainly  based  on  information from  top  and  middle 
management where we did not interview employees directly. However we  believe that the exceptional 
research opportunity compensates for the lack of systematic planning. We managed to follow up  this 
study through an opinion survey in the newly formed local office and hope so to address a number of 
questions which are not dealt with in  this paper. For example we continue to  study the impact of the 
issues described above on the quality of the transition process and the final operational functioning at 
the newly formed local office. Nevertheless we are convinced that this approach is an important trail in 
order to  improve the effectiveness and rate of success and  decrease considerably the cost (financial, 
distribution, market share, technical, human, ... )  of take-overs and acquisitions. 
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